Indiana Business Law Blog

Buying and selling goods at auction: When does “sold” mean “sold”?

May 6, 2022 | Michael R. Smith

istockphoto-477779010-170x170-2-150x113 From a legal perspective, auctions are interesting transactions.

Offer and acceptance in most sales

Let’s start by discussing an ordinary contract for the sale of goods, one not created at auction. Law students learn in their first year that the formation of a contract requires, among other things, offer and acceptance. Generally speaking, an offer must include all the essential elements of a contract and may include other terms. An acceptance must be the “mirror image” of the offer. That means, to form a contract from the offer, the person to whom the offer is made must accept it exactly as presented, without changing any of the terms or introducing new ones. A purported acceptance that changes, removes, or adds terms is not an acceptance at all. It is a rejection of the offer and the extension of a counteroffer.

LLC Membership and Interest

July 6, 2020 | Michael R. Smith

The limited liability company is a relatively new form of business entity, with most state statutes adopted in the 1990s. In just a few years, they overtook the corporation as the most common structure for new businesses. A reason for the LLC’s popularity is that the it combines some of the most desirable aspects of corporations with some of the most desirable aspects of partnerships, but that blending of characteristics can also be a source of confusion. For example, LLCs work much like partnerships when it comes to ownership rights, but people often incorrectly assume ownership that LLC interest is analogous to corporate stock and that LLC membership is analogous to being a corporate shareholder.

The owners of corporations are called shareholders and their ownership rights are embodied in shares of stock, a form of intangible personal property comprising a bundle of rights, some economic and some non-economic. The principal economic right is the right to receive dividends (usually cash) from the corporation, and the principal non-economic right is the right to vote in an election of directors and other matters that may be submitted to a vote of the shareholders. Although there can be restrictions (typically set out in the company’s articles of incorporation or bylaws, or a contract among shareholders or between a shareholder and the corporation), stock is generally transferable from one person to another. A person who acquires stock (thus becoming a shareholder) receives both sets of rights, economic (dividends) and non-economic (voting). It makes no difference how the person acquires the stock –by purchase, by gift, by inheritance, as compensation to an employee, or by court order (in a divorce or otherwise); a person who owns stock holds both economic and non-economic rights.

Limited liability companies also have economic and non-economic rights. The principal economic right is the right to receive distributions (usually cash) from the company, and the principal non-economic right is the right to participate in the management of the company’s business and affairs. A crucial distinction between LLCs and corporations is that the economic and non-economic rights associated with LLCs are not bundled together in a single package the way those rights in a corporation are bundled together in stock.

Small Businesses Receive Help with Coronavirus Paid Leave

March 26, 2020 | Michael R. Smith

As we discussed in a recent post, the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (“FFCRA”) requires small businesses to paid employees for time away from work for various reasons related to the coronavirus epidemic.

The FFRCA provides two types of benefits.

Employers must pay an employee at his or her regular rate of pay if the employee is unable to work or telework because of a federal, state, or local order related to COVID-19, or because the employee has been advised by a health care provider to self-quarantine because of COVID-19 concerns, or because the employee has symptoms of a coronavirus infection and is seeking a diagnosis.

Small Businesses Must Pay Employees for Coronavirus Absence

March 23, 2020 | Michael R. Smith

[For an update based on agency guidance please see Small Businesses Receive Help with Coronavirus Paid Leave.]

On March 18, Congress passed, and the President signed on the same day, the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA) that, among other things, requires employers to give employees paid time off for certain absences that result from the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic. This article summarizes the obligations of employers and the rights of employees under the FFCRA. This article is only a summary and does not address all the details and nuances of the statute. In addition, because the FFCRA was enacted and signed so quickly, there may be questions without obvious answers. You may contact our office to inquire about obtaining advice regarding your specific situation as either an employee or employer.

What Employers Are Covered?

Deceptive Consumer Sales Act Does Not Apply

December 5, 2019 | Michael R. Smith

In a recent post, we discussed Rainbow Realty Group Inc., v. Carter, in which the Indiana Supreme Court considered whether a particular “rent-to-buy contract” was a land contract or a rental agreement. The court held that the transaction was a rental agreement, notwithstanding language in the contract that the transaction was a purchase and not a lease. Accordingly, the property was subject to the statutory requirement that a dwelling unit subject to a rental agreement must be in clean, safe, habitable condition. Because the house was clearly uninhabitable, Rainbow Realty violated that requirement.

Next, the Court considered the claim of the Carters that Rainbow Realty’s unsuccessful attempt to disclaim the statutory warranty of a safe, clean, habitable dwelling violated the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (or “DCSA”), Ind. Code ch. 24‑5‑0.5. In particular, the Carters relied on Ind. Code § 24‑5‑0.5‑3(a)(8)*, which (at the time the rent-to-buy contract was signed) provided that a supplier’s representation that a “consumer transaction involves or does not involve a warranty, a disclaimer of warranties, or other rights, remedies, or obligations, if the representation is false and if the supplier knows or should reasonably know that the representation is false” is a deceptive act actionable under Ind. Code § 24‑5‑0.5‑4(a), which provides a private cause of action for consumers who are the victims of deceptive acts. The court held that the tenants had no DCSA claim, for no less than three distinct reasons.

First, a false representation that Subsection 3(b)(8) defines a deceptive act as including a false representation that a transaction does or does not involve a warranty only if the supplier (i.e., Rainbow Realty) knows that its representation is false. In this case, the Supreme Court held that Rainbow Realty did not know its representation was false and, therefore, did not commit a deceptive act. Indeed the Supreme Court pointed to the fact that three members of the Court of Appeals agreed that the transaction was a land contract and, therefore, that Rainbow Realty’s representation of the absence of a warranty of habitability was, in fact, true. In essence, the Supreme Court held that no one could have known whether the representation was false until the court held that it was false.

Land Contract or Residential Lease?

September 20, 2019 | Michael R. Smith

If you’re as old as I am, you might remember the television commercial in which twin sisters argued about the nature of Certs. One said, “Certs is a candy mint,” and her sister countered, “Certs is a breath mint.” A booming male voice over said, “Stop. You’re both right. Certs is a candy mint and a breath mint. Certs is two, two, two mints in one.”*

In Rainbow Realty Group, Inc. v. Carter, the Indiana Supreme Court encountered a real estate transaction in which one litigant said, “It’s a land contract,” and the other countered, “It’s a rental agreement.” Unlike the twins in the Certs commercial, only one was right.

Rainbow was a property manager for a trust that owned multiple houses for sale or rent in Marion County, Indiana. It offered four different types of transactions to its customers. The first three were fairly standard:

Veil Piercing: Plaintiff Left With No Recourse, and That’s Okay

November 25, 2018 | Michael R. Smith

Suppose you sue a corporation or a limited liability company and win, but the defendant has no money to pay your award and no other assets you can execute against. Is that a factor that justifies piercing the veil to make the owners of the company pay your award? The Indiana Court of Appeals answered that question, and a couple of others related to veil piercing, in Country Contractors, Inc. v. A Westside Storage of Indianapolis, Inc.

Country Contractors was incorporated in 1983 as a seller of ready-mix concrete under the name Country Concrete, Inc. In the 1990’s the company expanded its business to include construction work and excavation. Over the years, Country Contractors owned a substantial amount of assets in the form of construction equipment that it leased to other contractors. In 2007 the corporation changed its name to Country Contractors, Inc. and amended its articles of incorporation to better reflect its expanded line of business. Its two shareholders served as the board of directors, but three other people were responsible for running the company from day to day — preparing bids, executing contracts, and supervising the work.

In 2007, Westside engaged Country Contractors to perform excavation and construction services for the price of $235,000. Country Contractors subcontracted much of the work, which began in 2008. The two owners were not involved in the negotiation or execution of the contract, nor did they supervise the work.

Homeowners’ Associations and Election Signs

October 5, 2018 | Michael R. Smith

A few weeks ago, we hired a contractor to do some painting at our house. As many contractors do, he put a sign in our yard while he was there. He didn’t ask us for permission, but if he had we would have given it to him. A few days later, in fact after the painter and his sign were gone, we received a nastygram from our homeowner’s association informing us that our covenants prohibit any signs in the yard other than a sign advertising the property for sale. I noticed that there is no exception for political signs, and I wondered why we had not received a nastygram a few years ago when we put a candidate’s sign in our yard before an election.

I now know the answer to that, thanks to a recent Face Book post from my friend, Greg Purvis, an attorney at Spangler, Jennings, & Dougherty, P.C.

Greg pointed out that Indiana law, specifically Ind. Code § 32‑21‑13‑4,* prohibits homeowners’ associations from adopting or enforcing rules prohibiting certain types of signs on a homeowner’s property from thirty days before an election until five days after an election. It applies only to signs that meet one or more of the following descriptions:

History of the Johnson Amendment

October 2, 2018 | Michael R. Smith

The Johnson Amendment, which has been in the news from time to time for the last couple of years, is sometimes described as prohibiting tax exempt churches from campaigning for candidates for elected office. That is accurate, but it applies more broadly than to churches. No organization is eligible for tax exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code if it

participate[s] in, or intervene[s] in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.

Last year, the President signed Executive Order 13798 that directed the Secretary of the Treasury to:

Defend Trade Secrets Act: Are Your Employment Agreements Up to Date?

September 3, 2018 | Michael R. Smith

Until recently, almost all trade secret law was furnished by state law, not federal law. Absent federal diversity jurisdiction, lawsuits for misappropriation of trade secrets had to be brought in state court. Even though the vast majority of states (including Indiana) have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”), there are nonetheless variations in trade secret law from one state to another. However, in May 2016 President Obama signed the Defend Trade Secrets Act (or “DTSA”), creating at 18 U.S.C. § 1836 a new federal civil cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets. Even so, the federal statute does not pre-empt state law, and state causes of action under the UTSA remain viable.

Definitions of Trade Secret and Misappropriation

Two crucial components of trade secret law are the definitions of trade secret and misappropriation. The DTSA definitions, found at 18 U.S.C. § 1839, are not identical to the familiar UTSA definitions, but there are no major surprises. At least for the most part, information that is a trade secret under the UTSA is also a trade secret under the DTSA, and vice versa. Similarly, there are likely very few acts that qualify as misappropriation under one statute but not the other.

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